Gérard Depayre
Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the United States of America

Columbia University in the City of New York

7th April, 2003

Keynote Address

Law and Governance in an Enlarged Europe Conference

1) Introduction

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to speak to such a distinguished audience of scholars and experts – and a danger of course, as for every single specific aspect of enlargement there is certainly someone in this room who knows far more about it than I. Fortunately for me, I’ve been asked to speak in the evening, at dinner, after you have already lived through half a day of very detailed presentations on legal and regulatory implications of enlargement. And, as it is difficult to enjoy a well-deserved meal and agreeable company whilst at the same time having to listen to a speech, I have resolved

a) to keep my remarks reasonably short, all things being relative;

b) to leave the realm of scholarly knowledge and simply throw out a number of thoughts on the political significance of enlargement for Europe and for the relationship between the United States and Europe. 

2) The fundamental significance of enlargement

Enlargement is more than anything else the end of what historians may one day call the century of inter-European strife and separation. In 1914, when Europe was still the undisputed center of the world, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked as the war broke out:

“The lights are going out all over Europe and I doubt we will see them go on again in our lifetime.”

He was right. Indeed, they did not go back on for all Europeans until 1989. It was only after two world wars, after the brutality of Nazism, the horrors of genocide, the temporary success of totalitarian regimes, after the harsh divide of the Iron Curtain, that Europe at last saw the lights go on for all its peoples again. Enlargement is the transformation of that moment into a stable European political order.

All difficulties of making it work – and there are difficulties – should not obscure the fundamental fact that enlargement is an extraordinary second chance for a continent that had almost self-destructed and whose eastern half had paid an especially heavy price.

Enlargement is, thus, above all, a reason for great satisfaction. If enlargement were in doubt, Europe would be in doubt. After the end of the cruel and artificial division of the continent, any attempt to erect new barriers and to divide Europe into political and economic haves and political and economic have-nots would have been a tragic mistake. The mistake was not made, and on the 1 May 2004 Europe is set to celebrate the confirmation of what took place in 1989. It will truly be a Europe whole and free.

3) The transformation of the European Union

This is not to say that enlargement will be a cake-walk. Enlargement is definitely not only a great opportunity but also a great challenge that has and will require tough slugging.

It is not easy to join societies together that have lived separately for almost fifty years. Let us not belittle that fact. The Union is no coalition of states, is no international organisation – it is and remains first and foremost a “joint society,” a genuine community where the common frame of European law and regulations, adopted by the members in Brussels,  binds our countries in ways that directly affect the daily lives of our citizens down to sometimes very mundane details.

The more obscure of EC regulations regularly give rise to satirical comments, sometimes understandably so. But on the other hand: it is perhaps easier to share a great political vision than to agree on the nitty-gritty. On common standards for environmental protection or the safety of children’s toys, on rules regarding accounting and the like. The mundane is a big part of our life, it is a big part of political life, and it is a big part of the European integration. As anyone who is or has ever been married knows, it is the ultimate test of the desire to live together. And our quality of life has more to do with taking care of the mundane, in a good and fair way, than many acknowledge.

The new members have made incredible progress over the past decade in bringing up their laws and regulations to the level of modern European governance – a feat which is perhaps not always justly recognised. There was no textbook for such a transformation of societies under communist dictatorship into modern democracies with the trappings of the rule of law and service-oriented administrations. It has been a difficult process at times, with governments forced to make difficult choices – and I believe it is not presumptuous to say that, without the “reward” of EU membership, this effort could have been politically much more difficult to push through.

And honesty requires me to say that we’re not entirely there yet either. The process is not yet completed, as amazing as the achievements are. In several of the accession countries, administrative and judicial structures need to be further reformed and strengthened. There are those where corruption is still an issue. Industrial restructuring has by no means been completed in all of them. This is also true for agriculture. Over time, the problems of the new countries will become comparable to those of the current members, and in some areas the new members are already ahead: the electricity market in Slovakia is more open than in France; private ownership of the banking sector in stronger in Estonia than in Germany. 

Nonetheless, when looking at the task of actually implementing and enforcing the “acquis communautaire,” a rule-book basically written by wealthy states, we need to keep in mind what incredible performance we are asking of new members whose average GDP per capita is roughly 40% of the average of the present Union. I am confident that, given the proper support, it can be done. For it is do-able: remember Ireland which joined as the poorest member in a smaller Union, at just 60% of the average GDP per capita, and which today, 30 years later, is second only to Luxembourg. Societies, like individuals, can rise to the challenges demanded of them.

The enlarged Union must also rise to a political challenge. Because, beyond the task of ensuring the coherence of the Community pillar in the enlarged Union, there is also the even more daunting task of making sure that the overall structure remains workable and that an EU with 25 members does not end in permanent immobility. In this respect, the Convention chaired by former French President Giscard d’Estaing has its work cut out for it. There will be, I am confident, some form of constitution and a clarification of responsibilities in the Union. We know what we need – a constitutional arrangement that strikes the right balance between efficiency and legitimacy, the two key elements of successful political order. This is all the more necessary in a larger Union with even greater diversity. Easier said than done, of course – as the famous Polish writer S. Lec (pronounced Lem) wrote: Liberté, égalité, fraternité, of course – but how do we get down to the verbs? Today, at any rate, it is too early to zero in on specific arrangements. What I’ll propose instead to do is to give you my entirely personal view of how the enlarged Union will work.

In a nutshell: I believe the larger EU will reach out, consolidate and intensify.

1) It will reach out to its eastern and southern neighbors whose membership is either not at all envisageable or at best very far off by offering to extend the internal market rules and privileges, perhaps with restrictions on movement of persons. These neighbors would thus be part of an extended great single market.

2) In the enlarged EU itself the current acquis will be consolidated in the economic and regulatory sphere, including competition, environment, energy and transport to name but a few areas. The EU will push forward with macro-economic co-governance, where a special relationship between EURO members may solidify.

3) Building on this solid base, some countries will want to move faster and farther, taking a more political approach. I personally do not expect – nor hope for – a very institutional approach, where a fixed group would declare itself to be the avant-garde. I think you’re more likely to see a number of concrete actions being proposed by what often will be the same crowd, with varying numbers of other countries going along depending on the topic. This mechanism of “reinforced cooperation” in foreign policy matters for instance is already foreseen in the Treaty – in the future, I believe it will be used.

This is my scenario for the medium term. And the longer term? Not all, as Keynes famously said, but many of us will be dead by then. So I refuse to peek into the crystal ball. The definite shape of Europeis for the generation of my grandchildren to sort out. The foundations are there. Our task is to solidify them.

4) The EU-US relationship

Let me now close my presentation with two thoughts on the EU-US relationship, which has usually closely mirrored in the past the evolution of the EC and then the EU. An enlarged Union will be, in my view, by sheer size and potential, an even more important partner for the US than today.

First of all, the current political environment should not lead us to make a reverse version of the mistake of the ‘90s, where many considered that only economics mattered and politics and government were becoming irrelevant. Let us not today simply turn the tables and consider that, because politics and strategic issues dominate the news and sometimes our bad dreams, that economic issues have suddenly become secondary. That is mere appearance, pure illusion. Economics matter greatly. And the new Union, with 460 million citizens and consumers, will be a huge opportunity for US business, just as the Internal Market proved to be not some form of “Fortress Europe” as many had feared, but a huge opportunity for the United States.

Secondly, the intra-EU divisions on Iraq and the differences – undoubtedly hard feelings as well – between some member states’ governments and the US Administration should not lead us to believe the exciting and fashionable editorials predicting ever-deeper transatlantic rifts until our alliance collapses. I believe that the truth is far more boring. The truism that, when the US and Europe work together, much can be achieved and that divisions between them ultimately weaken both sides still holds true, as unexciting as such truisms may be.

The US has ultimately little to gain from a 19th century-type Europe and the instability that it would create. Some may see the short-term advantages in a “divide and rule” approach, where the more powerful US would find it easier to get its way. Short-term advantages of course exist, and using power to dominate is in human nature. But those who truly believe that such a course would be beneficial to the US are, in my view, not so much hard-nosed realists but simply shortsighted people. Why?  Because in tomorrow’s world, a united Europe that would be fundamentally at odds with the US is in fact one of the most unlikely political scenarios to imagine.

A more integrated Europe may talk back even more than it does today; it might occasionally offer alternative strategies and be even tougher in defending core interests. But there is no reason to believe that a United Europe would be so foolish as to think that a fundamentally adversarial relationship to the US is to its benefit. We are living in a world where other, non-Western powers are rising, reclaiming their right to equality after a long eclipse in terms of international power – think of China, think of India. And that is only fair and thus a good thing. But it will change the world.

Today, where ultimately only the US and, to a lesser extent, the European powers and Russia are strong international actors, it may sometimes appear that much divides us. Because we, or primarily the US, set the agenda – we are squabbling among ourselves, so to speak. The day the world becomes more multifaceted – and that day is not long off, it is being prepared, everyone who is willing to look can see it coming – it will be evident that the US and Europe share a common bond equal to no other, economically and politically. A stronger Europe – not a weaker US – would ensure that this relationship endures, a relationship of equals built on respect and a shared vision for the future. Allow me to speak for a moment like an American and simply say: We can do it.

Thank you very much for your attention.