Transatlantic Changeovers – An Early Opportunity to Reenergize the Agenda

“Transatlantic Changeovers – An Early Opportunity to Reenergize the Agenda”¹

Ambassador Dr. Guenter Burghardt
Head of the European Commission Delegation in the United States

Any discussion about the future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and about “how the rifts in CFSP can be repaired” must give prominence to the European Union’s relationship with the United States. Economically, politically and strategically, no other relationship has greater impact on its partners, on regional developments and on the global community. This presents both positives and negatives, opportunities and risks: it may sound trivial but remains true that, working together, the EU and US can make great progress in addressing many of the world’s problems, while our disagreements place roadblocks in the way of almost any solution.

My tenure as Head of the European Commission Delegation in Washington, from early 2000 to late 2004, covering the last year of the Clinton Administration and four highly challenging years under Bush “43,” has seen much of both. The Clinton Administration basically continued to adhere to the traditional concept of an US/EU partnership as a strategically important axis of the foreign policy of the US—the “indispensable nation”—as set down in the “New Transatlantic Agenda” (NTA) adopted in December 1995. This was followed by the foreign policy of the Bush Administration, which began by disavowing a number of international agreements, leading to growing tensions with the EU already during the first eight months preceding September 11, 2001², when the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington marked a crucial crossroads for President Bush and EU/US relations.

Indeed, the unprecedented challenge of America’s sense of invulnerability represented a widely underestimated turning point in America’s foreign and security policy. When the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission, Verhofstadt and Prodi, met President Bush in the Oval Office on 27 September, 2001 to express Europe’s unreserved solidarity with the US, those dramatic events seemed to provide “a new opportunity to working together” (in the words of President Bush). Sadly, that opportunity was not realized. Instead, after a period of international unity focused on Afghanistan, the US resumed a policy of unilaterally determining an agenda of “war on terror” for which they preferred assembling an ad-hoc “coalition of the willing.” As a consequence, and for reasons of own shortcomings, the EU was unable to respond collectively as a Union, and its members split into those who decided to follow and those who opposed the US advocating a more comprehensive and internationally legitimized approach of what in Europe we prefer to call “fight against terrorism.” This did not, however, prevent the EU and the US to make rapid progress on a number of homeland security and counter-terrorism measures and continuing our work together on Afghanistan, crucial achievements that have continued without interruption despite the most serious worsening of the transatlantic political climate over the war against Iraq.

Unfortunately, for much of 2002 and 2003, the general tenor of EU-US relations was uneasy and combative, with negative fallout also within the EU. Since then, we have seen some improvement as rifts created by Iraq have begun to settle. The June 2004 EU-US Summit at Dromoland Castle with the quite substantive set of seven policy declarations emerging from that meeting brought a sense of new realism to the transatlantic relationship. On the US side, the neoconservative agenda of preemption and preeminence, of the “mission determining the coalition,” obviously hit limits of military, financial and moral overstretch, while on the EU side the need to address together post-Iraq as part of the problems of the Middle East, a region even closer to Europe than to the US, could only enhance Europe’s drive towards reinforcing its foreign and security policy, also against the background of a successful enlargement and agreement on a Constitutional Treaty.

Much of the effectiveness of the CFSP and the EU’s capabilities within the transatlantic partnership will depend on its ability to take forward the changes foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty, including Solana’s prospective role as EU Foreign Minister, and a number of other significant steps, such as the envisaged transformation of Commission Delegations into full European Union Embassies for all EU related matters. The success of these measures will largely be determined by the desire of EU Member States to provide the necessary political authority and resources, which will in turn serve to increase or decrease the EU’s profile among Washington policymakers.

The forthcoming unprecedented coincidence in transatlantic changeovers, a newly elected European Parliament, and a new Commission assuming office on 1 November, with the next US President and a new Congress elected on November 2, will provide an opportunity, on both sides, at a very early stage to exchange political messages, to reassess the state of the transatlantic relationship and to agree on how to reenergize the transatlantic agenda, in the areas of the economy, foreign and security policy, overall strategy and the strengthening of EU/US consultative mechanisms. Statements made by the incoming Commission President have already highlighted the importance the new Commission will attach to the transatlantic relationship. And both candidates in the US presidential election campaign are making clear that, regardless of who prevails, the EU will be presented with a lengthy and wide ranging wish list, as both candidates have, in different terms, expressed high level expectations for European cooperation and support.

The EU-US economic relationship holds important lessons for the EU’s foreign policy aspirations and future EU-US relations. Particularly in the area of trade policy, the EU has developed a coherent approach and EU/US interaction has reached an unprecedented level of intensity under Lamy and Zoellick that has earned the EU collective respect as an equal partner by Administration and Congress. At the global level, combined EU-US leadership must be the driving force if the Doha Development round is to be successfully completed in 2005. The Economic Declaration agreed at the June EU/US Summit sets our medium-term sights on the achievement of a barrier-free transatlantic market. To this effect, the EU and US have launched concurrent public consultations seeking innovative proposals from all relevant stakeholders, building on those made by the Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the Transatlantic Policy Network. Given the overriding importance of the transatlantic economy, the most globalised part of the global economy, such development would also constitute a powerful corollary to the EU’s Lisbon process of economic reform.

With regard to foreign and security policy, much will depend on the EU’s ability to develop more effective diplomatic and security capabilities. Only with the development of "hard" power capacities, as Javier Solana and other EU leaders have noted, will the EU’s impressive "soft" power resources gain the credit they deserve. In American parlance it is essential for the EU to "put up" and to "step to the table." Of course our American friends must also review the principles underpinning their foreign and security policies. However, that is frankly a debate that the EU can only hope to influence by doing its homework and increasing its own capacities. As Commissioner Patten stated, Europe must seek to act as "a super-partner and not a super-sniper" in the anticipation of greater United States commitment to acting as a responsible world leader. Or, in the words of President Barroso, the EU must become a respected counterpart, not a perceived antagonistic counterweight.

Joint EU-US cooperation will be required in a number of foreign policy "hotspots," including:

The Balkans, where the US ultimately expects to be relieved of security duties as Europe takes complete responsibility, and where the EU must equally importantly engage regional partners on standards and status;
Afghanistan, where the Eurocorps is bolstering NATO, having assumed command of ISAF, and where the EU and the US are the largest contributors to the economic and political reconstruction effort;
Iraq, as noted earlier a source of substantial disagreement, but where all partners are focused on improving future developments. It is possible that, looking beyond the US Presidential election, a new approach could be adopted taking inspiration from the Dayton model that would bring together the several Iraqi groups concerned, neighboring states, and major international actors including, of course, the US and, with the opportunity to provide for a much stronger input, the EU;
Iran, a good candidate for combining the EU and US approaches, potentially yielding a "grand bargain" trading improved Iranian nuclear cooperation for US recognition of Iran’s geopolitical concerns;
the Middle East Peace Process, where all partners must get much more serious in pushing the Roadmap forward.

More fundamentally, the EU and the US would both benefit from a dialogue on respective security strategies, as spelled out in the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of September 2002 and the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003. Key issues in such a dialogue would include a common threat analysis and a genuine effort to close the gap between the US doctrines of pre-emption and pre-eminence and developing a fully complementary conceptual and strategic approach against terrorism, a policy area where substantial progress has already been made. This would incorporate both the US stress on the military option in a war against terror, and the EU approach emphasizing measures which fight the root causes of terrorism. We must respectfully consult on our approaches to securing a more peaceful world, seek agreement on objectives and follow through using the complementary blend of EU and US capabilities. Although transatlantic relations will for some time remain characterized by some degree of asymmetry, partnership must be based on mutual respect and the realistic assumption that agreement will not always be possible on all issues and therefore that any disagreements must be managed equally respectfully. It is widely recognized that we might not be able to afford another crisis à la Iraq without seriously putting at risk the very basis of our partnership.

Finally, future pursuit of joint EU-US economic, security and strategic interests will require adaptation of our consultative mechanisms. The NTA process, launched in 1995 and based on the earlier Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, has served us well and continues to play an important role in structuring Ministerial and Summit level meetings. Speaking as one who was "present at the creation" of that process, however, it is clear that the NTA needs a fresh infusion of political momentum to take the next decade of transatlantic partnership forward effectively.

On the EU side, the occasion of the historic entry into force of a European Constitution during the term of the incoming leaders on both sides of the Atlantic could present an opportunity to further strengthen political commitment to EU-US partnership. Such a commitment could take the form of a binding document, maybe entitled “Transatlantic Declaration of Interdependence,” recalling President Kennedy’s famous address of 4 July 1962 that foresaw the day when Europe could engage in a true partnership of equals.

¹Contribution to a publication of Friends of Europe, Brussels, on the chapter “How can the rifts in CSFP be repaired?” to be part of Blueprint for the Barroso Commission. This text reflects the author’s personal views.
²The first EU/US Summit at Gothenburg, Sweden, in June 2001 had, indeed, left a bitter aftertaste with President Bush and his closest advisors notably, but not exclusively, because of the controversies over Kyoto.